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Deficit reduction fever: Why the Clinton budget will not
reduce the deficit
by Steve Adams, Director, State Planning Office
The recent announcement by a financially healthy Proctor and Gamble to eliminate 13,000 jobs
captures the crux of the current economic malaise in Maine and across the country. At this point
in the economic cycle, employers would typically be adding jobs. But Maine and U.S. companies
are now eliminating many good jobs and replacing them with fewer, lower wage jobs. The
absence of a macroeconomic stimulus is accelerating the process of industrial restructuring in a
way that harms the long-term economic health of Maine and the United States and will generate
persistent underemployment and government budget deficits.
The recession that began in 1990 has put many people out of work. In Maine, 40,000 jobs were
lost between 1989 and 1992. Of these, 70 percent were in industries that pay higher than average
wages and offer full-time employment and benefits. These include 11,100 manufacturing jobs
(primarily transportation equipment, metals and electronics), 11,400 construction jobs, 3,000
wholesale and banking jobs, and 2,500 federal civilian jobs. In effect, the recession has added
28,000 people to the unemployment rolls in Maine, who were earning between $23,000 (in the
banking industry) to $38,000 (in the paper industry). These are in addition to the 8,400 retail jobs
lost during the period.
In a typical recovery, many of these workers would have returned to work by now. Some
permanent losses would occur as companies eliminate inefficient or excess production, but job
levels would return to something approximating pre-recession levels. The process of adjustment
would continue, but at a more gradual pace and in the context of an expanding economy. At-risk
workers would, at least, be employed and have the economic and social supports needed to make
adjustments to new job requirements. However, this "recovery" continues to be especially
anemic. Seasonally adjusted employment levels in June 1993 were roughly equivalent to the low
reached in 1992. Job growth in Maine is expected to be just over one percent during 1993 and to
remain at this weak pace through the decade. National Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been
growing at annual rate of well below the three percent level required to generate new job
demand.
Persistent weak demand and weak employment and income growth prevent companies from
raising prices. The only avenue to higher profits is to reduce costs. This is achieved by adopting
more efficient production techniques and, especially, by closing down production that was once
marginally profitable. Consequently, firms have fewer jobs and the remaining jobs have a new
array of requirements.

The protracted recession that began in 1990 is accelerating the process of industrial restructuring
in a way that will be harmful to the long-term economic health of Maine and the U.S. We are
eliminating medium-skilled/moderate-to-high wage jobs from the U.S. and Maine economies at
an unprecedented pace. This accelerated adjustment is resulting in a large and growing number
of unemployed and underemployed workers. This "correction," in the quaint vernacular of
economists, may be good for company bottom lines, but it has a high and lasting economic cost
to society. Many of the former manufacturing and construction workers who could once make a
living wage with modest education and training will remain unemployable in this environment,
except in very low-wage jobs. Even the low-wage retail and service jobs will not be growing
very rapidly, because consumer demand will remain weak. These 28,000 middle-class
households, whose primary wage earner will remain underemployed for a considerable period of
time, will not be able to pay mortgages, health insurance, or other elements of the secure lifestyle
to which they had grown accustomed. They will, instead, join other underemployed households
who sustain a very heavy demand on publicly-financed social services.
In a typical recovery, these people would have had more time to adjust to this change, and they
would have done so in an environment of general economic expansion. This adjustment may
have been supported by their employer, and at least with the support of a paycheck, and the
housing, food, healthcare and self-esteem it buys. Instead, they will be struggling to bolster their
education and training while they are unemployed and burdened by the cost of training and
education, and the need to house, clothe and feed their families.
The fiscal impact of this dynamic is obvious. Slow job growth will generate weak revenues while
prolonged underemployment will increase government costs, a formula for deficits. Ironically,
this effect will be directly attributed to federal deficit reduction policies.
This is not a typical recovery. The principal difference between this and the recoveries of the
past is the absence of economic stimuli. The federal government refused to offer meaningful
economic stimulus because of a political interest in reducing the deficit. Instead, in the interest of
reducing the deficit, the federal government has committed to reduce aggregate demand by
roughly $200 billion per year. The result of this political decision will be to prolong the current
economic stagnation and to risk a long-term cycle of tax increases and social service cuts. In the
face of federal fiscal contraction, the number of employed persons will not increase and wages
will certainly not increase, con-straining federal revenue growth. At the same time, the demand
for social support for formerly middle-class families and the long-term poor alike will expand.
This will, ironically and inevitably, increase the deficit. The rising deficit will fuel a cycle of
demands to reduce social spending further and the need to raise taxes further.
In sum, the refusal to stimulate an economic recovery has left millions of workers jobless for a
protracted period of time, has expedited the process of eliminating medium-skill/medium-to-high
wage jobs, and has created an exceptionally large unemployed labor pool to compete for a
shrinking number of decent jobs. Companies that survive this recession may be somewhat more
competitive in the short term. But Maine citizens and businesses will pay a great cost in a higher
and prolonged demand for social support and even higher cost in human suffering and
community disruption.

Policy issues for Maine
Maine has directed its limited tools on this economic malaise. The $80 million Jobs Bond in
1992 was designed to counter sagging construction employment and to provide capital to
businesses suffering from the "credit crunch." Similarly, efforts to improve the disposable
income of businesses and individuals motivated the elimination of temporary income taxes.
Unfortunately, in a state as small as Maine, these approaches can offer only marginal stimulus to
Maine’s $25 billion economy. In this environment, Maine government will have to strengthen its
capacity to assist workers to adjust to the rapidly changing economic environment. Of particular
importance will be:
•

•

•

Re-doubling efforts to provide help in matching workers to jobs. The economy will
produce replacement jobs (openings resulting from retirements and relocations) and the
modest re-hiring that will occur. However, public job placement services need to
increase greatly their connections to private job openings.
Rationalizing Maine’s all-too- fragmented job training, development, and placement
services "network." The current system is not well-designed to serve the large number of
skilled and semi-skilled workers seeking employment assistance.
Anticipating continued upward pressures on costly social support systems in combination
with weak state revenues.

Meaningful improvements in the Maine economy can only come from more active
macroeconomic intervention by the federal government or some other unforeseen economic
stimulus. However, the current national politics have produced the counter-Keynesian policy of
reducing aggregate demand during economic recession and has relegated the U.S. and Maine
economies to protracted stagnation and larger federal deficits.
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